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Reapportionment-Nine Years into the "Revolution" and 
Still Struggling 
Malapportioned legislative districts traditionally have inhibited 
the effective working of government at the federal, state, and local 
levels. By 1960, the population disparities among legislative districts 
had attained such great magnitude "that the integrity of representa-
tive government was in many instances endangered."1 The under-
represented victims of malapportionment sought relief through the 
courts. Initially the Supreme Court, ever hesitant to enter the "polit-
ical thicket," declined to address itself to reapportionment contro-
versies.2 This era of judicial inaction ended in 1962 with the Court's 
I. McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 M1c11. L REY. 
223, 226 (1968). 
2. In Colegrove v. Green, 828 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946), the Court, speaking through 
Justice Frankfurter, had declined to review malapportionment in congressional district• 
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ruling in Baker v. Carr,8 in which the plaintiffs overcame the formi-
dable barrier posed by the political-question doctrine. In Baker, 
the Court granted individual voters standing to challenge anti-
quated electoral districts and thereby ignited the "reapportionment 
revolution."4 
I. THE EVOLVING STANDARDS AND EFFECTS OF THE 
REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 
A. The Initial Cases 
Shortly after resolving the standing question in Baker, the Court 
began to lay the groundwork for a restructuring of the nation's rep-
resentative bodies. In Wesberry v. Sanders,6 the Court relied on 
article I, section 2 of the Constitution6 to invalidate Georgia's con-
gressional redistricting program. The state legislature was instructed 
to redraw district lines so that as "nearly as is practicable one man's 
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as an-
other's."7 
The severely malapportioned state legislatures were the next to 
be constitutionally scrutinized. In Reynolds v. Sims, 8 the Court in-
voked the equal protection command of the fourteenth amendment 
to require that states "make an honest and good faith effort to con-
struct districts, in both houses of [their] legislature[s], as nearly of 
equal population as is practicable."9 Although the Court did not 
spell out any precise constitutional tests, it did present some general 
guidelines for legislative action.10 "Mathematical exactness" in pop-
ulation among the districts was rejected as "hardly a workable con-
stitutional requirement."11 Rather, the "overriding objective" of a 
ing because it wo.uld be "hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in 
the politics of the people." 
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION, REAPPORTION-
MENT IN LAW AND POLITICS il9·38 (1968). 
4. 369 U.S. at 197-98, 208-37. The impact o[ the Baker decision cannot be over-
emphasized. In evaluating all oE his Court's rulings, former Chief Justice Warren con• 
sidered it as the most important, its impact eclipsing even that oE Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). N.1'.. Times, July 6, 1968, at 42, col. I. 
5. 376 U.S. I (1964). 
6. "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 
second Year by the People of the several States •••• " 
7. 376 U.S. at 8. 
8., 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
9. 377 U.S. at 577. 
·10. The Justices were careful not to imply that Reynolds represented a judicial 
usurpation of the legislative role in redistricting. They reiterated that "legislative 
reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative considerntion and determination." 
377 U.S. at 586. For a discussion of the problems posed by this preference for legislative 
rcapyorti~nment, see Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1226, 1267 (1966). 
11, 877 U.S. at 577. 
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reapportionment scheme was to be "substantial [population] equal-
ity. "12 This standard, however, was not to be an end in itself. Sub-
stantial population equality was to be just the vehicle to achieve the 
"basic aim of legislative apportionment"-that being "fair and effec-
tive representation for all citizens.''13 
In one of the several reapportionment cases decided on the same 
day as Reynolds, Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly,14 the Court 
rejected the State's reapportionment program even though the elec-
torate had approved it as a constitutional amendment. The decision 
elaborated somewhat on the "as nearly as practicable" standard. The 
plan established districts for the lower house of the legislature with 
a maximum population-variance ratio between the most and least 
populous districts of 1.7 to 1.15 The Court reserved the question 
whether this size deviation by itself violated constitutional requisites. 
The upper-house apportionment, which "clearly involve[ d] depar-
tures from population-based representation too extreme to be con-
stitutionally permissible"16 (a population-variance ratio of 3.6 to I), 
was sufficient to invalidate the entire proposal. Thus Lucas presented 
to the lower courts the further necessity of evaluating an apportion-
ment scheme "in its totality" to determine whether the necessary 
"good faith effort to establish districts substantially equal in popula-
tion has been made.''17 
B. The Extension of the Reynolds Doctrine 
into Local Government 
Although Reynolds limited its scope to "both houses of a state 
legislature,"18 lower courts soon applied its principles to local gov-
ernments possessed of legislative power.19 These courts reasoned that 
12. 377 U.S. at 579. 
13. 377 U.S. at 565-66. 
14. 377 U.S. 713 (1964). In addition to Reynolds and Lucas, the following cases 
were decided on the same day with full opinions: WMCA, Inc. v. Lomcnzo, 377 U.S. 
633 (1964) (New York); Maryland Commn. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 
656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 
695 (1964) (Delaware). Vann v. Baggett and McConnell v. Baggett, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) 
(Alabama), were decided as companion cases to Reynolds. 
15. 377 U.S. at 727. 
16. 377 U.S. at 728. 
17. 377 U.S. at 735 n.27. 
18. 377 U.S. at 577. 
19 See, e.g., Davis v. Dusch, 361 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1966), revd., 387 U.S. 112 (1967) 
(Virginia Beach City Council); Ellis v. Mayor &: City Council, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 
1965) (Baltimore City Council); Brouwer v. Bronkema, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98 
(1966) (Kent County Board of Supervisors); State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 
43, 132 N.W.2d 249 (1965) (every Wisconsin County Board of Supervisors except those 
of Milwaukee and Menominee Counties); Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 
N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965) (Common Council of Binghamton). See also R, 
DIXON, supra note 3, at 544. 
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the delegation of such power by a state to its political subdivisions 
(counties, municipalities, and towns) was sufficient state action to 
impose the obligations of the fourteenth amendment, and the stan-
dards of Reynolds, on the apportionment of their governing bodies.20 
On the basis of such decisions, an action was instituted in 1965 
against the governing body of Rockland County, New York, by a 
citizen of the county. Lodico v. Board of Supervisors21 attacked the 
constitutionality of the structure of the county Board of Supervisors, 
which consisted of five members each of whom simultaneously 
served as the executive of one of the county's five towns (Orange-
to'wn, Ramapo, Haverstraw, Clarkstown, and Stony Point).22 Under 
this system of local government, a supervisor's election to the post 
of town executive automatically made him its representative to the 
county body. Thus the county's legislative districts were established, 
not on the basis of population, but according to town boundaries.23 
The Lodico court recognized the population disparity among the 
towns24 and ordered the formulation of a reapportionment plan.25 
The Board, acting on the suggestion of a previously established re-
apportionment commission,26 presented a plan to the county's voters 
in November of 1966. It was rejected by the electorate.27 This pro-
posal, popularly known as Plan B, preserved town boundaries as 
20. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 59-60, 132 N.W.2d 
249, 257 (1965); Brouwer v. Bronkema, No. 1885 (Cir. Ct. Kent County, Mich., Sept. II, 
1964), affd. by an equally divided court, 377 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98 (1966), discttSsed 
in Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment on Counties and Other 
Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 21, 27 (1965). 
21. 256 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The action had been initially instituted in a 
state court, but the defendants removed to a federal district court. Lodico v. Board 
of Supervisors, 256 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
22. Rockland County's "towns" could also be referred to as townships. However, 
since the state custom is to refer to such bodies as towns, that designation will be 
used herein. 
23. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, THIS IS ROCKLAND COUNTY 5 (2d rev. ed. 1963), on 
file with the Michigan Law Review. At about the same time, other similarly appor-
tioned New York county governments, authorized by N.Y. CouNTY LAw art 4, § 150 
(McKinney 1950), were also challenged in federal and state courts. See, e.g., Bianchi 
v. Griffing, 238 F. Supp. 997 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 15 (1965), reinstituted, 
256 F. Supp. 617 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (involving Suffolk County); Augostini v. Lasky, 46 
Misc. 1058, 262 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1965). 
24. 256 F. Supp. at 444. The two criteria used by the court to evaluate the extent of 
the malapportionment were the ratio of population between the largest and the smallest 
towns and the percentage of the total population that could elect a majority of the 
Board. Orangetown's population of 43,172 was 4.9 times greater than Stony Point's 
8,739. In addition, 58,567 out of a total of 136,803 county residents, or 43% of the 
population, controlled a majority of the seats on the Board. 256 F. Supp. at 444. 
25. 256 F. Supp. at 450. The court also gave the defendants the alternative of pre-
paring a charter embodying provisions for the election of a legislative body for the 
county on a reapportioned basis. 256 F. Supp. at 450. 
26. The reapportionment commission had been established by the Board of Super-
visors in July of 1965. 256 F. Supp. at 445. 
27. The Journal News (Nyack, N.Y.), Nov. 9, 1966, at 1, col. 3. 
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district lines by having each legislator elected at large from his own 
town. To comply with the "one man-one vote"28 principle, represen-
tatives were distributed among the towns on a population basis. This 
plan would have created multimember districts with Ramapo, the 
tmvn with the greatest population, receiving five seats, Orangetown 
and Clarkstown four seats, Haverstraw two seats, and Stony Point 
just one seat. The tradition that a supervisor serve simultaneously as 
both a town chieftain and its representative in the county legislature 
was to be continued.29 After the November election, Plan B and 
other schemes3° were reconsidered by the commission. One alterna-
tive proposed a legislature of seventeen members elected from single-
member districts. This program, in contrast to Plan B, was not fixed 
to existing town boundaries. Commonly referred to as Plan S, the 
proposal also prohibited the supervisors from serving in their dual 
capacity. However, in a special election of April 1967, the electorate 
turned down both Plan Sand the resubmitted Plan B.81 
Later in that year, a new commission reproposed Plan S's single-
member districting scheme to the Board.32 By September 1968, the 
supervisors' lack of response to this proposition prompted another 
citizen of the county to seek a judicial order directing the recalci-
trant Board of Supervisors either to reapportion itself or to hold a 
referendum on this most recent proposal by the commission.83 The 
Board's response was to submit a weighted voting plan to the state 
supreme court (trial division). On May 12, 1969, the court declared 
this proposal unconstitutional and directed the Board to submit an-
other plan "with all deliberate speed."84 
Shortly thereafter, the Board, again bypassing Plan S, presented 
the court with a multimember districting scheme similar to the twice 
previously rejected Plan B.35 The only distinction between this 
28. This expression had become the popular slogan for Reynolds' concept of sub-
stantial population equality or the "as nearly as is practicable" doctrine. IL~ judicial 
origin is Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963): 
"The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's 
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can 
mean only one thing-one person, one vote." 
29. I.EACUE OF '\VOMEN VOTERS OF THE TOWNS OF CLARKSTOWN, ORANGETOWN AND 
RAMAPO, 1966 VOTERS GUIDE (information pamphlet), on file with the Michigan Law 
Review; Brief for Petitioners June Molof et al. at 6, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 
(1971). 
30. Additional plans discussed at a February 1967 public hearing were a weighted 
voting scheme and a county-at-large proposal. Brief for Petitioners June Molof et al. 
at 6, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971). 
31. The Journal News, April 14, 1967, at 1, col. 4. 
32. Brief for Petitioners June Molof et al. at 6, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), 
33. Abate v. Mundt, 59 Misc. 2d 809, 300 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct, Rockland County 
1969). 
34. 59 Misc. 2d at 814, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 453, 
35. Brief for Petitioners June Molof et al. at 8, Abate v.,Mundt, 403 U.S._182 (1971), 
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revised Plan E and its unsuccessful predecessors was that its ap-
portionment of the legislative seats was based on the latest (1969) 
census. The revision (Plan B) created an enlarged legislature of 
eighteen members chosen from five legislative districts, which again 
corresponded to the town borders. The provision for the automatic 
seating of each town's supervisor on the county board was retained. 
Assignment of legislators among the towns was determined by their 
populations' relation to that of Stony Point's 12,114 residents. The 
number of seats granted the other districts were determined by 
dividing each town's population by this unit of 12,114. Fractional 
results were rounded off to the nearest integer. This process pro-
duced a population variation of 11.9% between the most overrep-
resented and underrepresented districts.so This time the state court 
upheld the constitutionality of the plan.s7 The decision, however, 
excluded the provision granting the town supervisors ex officio seats 
in the legislature. They could now continue to serve in both capaci-
ties only 1if they won an election for each position. Thus the pro-
tracted political and judicial struggle initiated by the Lodico deci-
sion began its journey through New York's appellate courts en route 
to the United States Supreme Court as Abate v. Mundt.ss 
C. The Supreme Court's Elucidation 
of the Reynolds Standard 
During the five years between the district court's Lodico decision 
and the subsequent ruling in Abate, the Supreme Court refined 
Reynolds' "as nearly as practicable" standard of population equality. 
In its 1967 decision of Swann v. Adams,s9 the Court examined 
Florida's attempt to adhere to Reynolds' commands. The defend-
ant's post-Reynolds reapportioned legislature had a maximum pop-
36. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184 (1971). The ideal population per legislator 
is calculated by dividing the total population (218,804) by the total number of repre-
sentatives (18). A town's deviation from equality is then obtained by comparing its 
population per legislator to the ideal of 12,156. Thus Stony Point is overrepresented 
by 0,3%, Haverstraw by 2.5%, and Clarkstown by 4,8%, while Ramapo is under-
represented by 0.2% and Orangetown by 7.1%. These deviations are based on the 












37. Abate v. Mundt (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term ~ockland County, July 21, 1969) (un-
reported), affd., 33 App. Div. 2d 660, 305 N.Y.S.2d 102 (2d Dept.), affd., 25 N.Y.2d 309, 
253 N.E.2d 189, 305 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1969), afjd., 403 U.S. 182 (1971). The unreported 
opinion ~s. reprinted in Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at. 12-29, Abate v. Mundt, 403 
U.S. 182 (1971). . . ·. ·. . · 
·38. 403 U.S. 182 (1971). 
89. 885 U.S. 440 (1967). 
592 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 70:586 
ulation-variance ratio among its senate districts of 1.30 to I (a total 
deviation of 25.65%). The disparity in the house was even greater.40 
Florida unsuccessfully contended that its plan, which was drawn to 
conform with existing congressional district lines, came "as close as 
'practical' to complete population equality."41 However, to the 
Court, it was "quite obvious" that the State could have created legis-
lative districts of more equal population.42 One indicium of the de-
fendant's lack of good faith in redrawing the district lines was its 
rejection of the plaintiff's alternative proposals, which would have 
measurably reduced many of the population disparities among the 
districts. 43 
Swann's invalidation of Florida's 25.65% disparity partially clari-
fied the arithmetic component of the "as nearly as practicable" stan-
dard of population equality established by Reynolds. However, 
even this enunciation of a more exacting test did not produce a 
definitive resolution of the doctrine's mathematical contours.44 In 
addition, Swann left unresolved several other questions of import. 
Although the Court indicated that it would tolerate unavoidable de 
minimis deviations,45 it failed to proffer any maximum percentage 
variance that would so qualify. Seemingly, the Court would also 
permit deviations of even Swann's magnitude if justified by "a satis-
factory explanation grounded on acceptable state policy."40 The 
Court, however, declined to describe any such "satisfactory explana-
tion." 
Swann, which involved a state legislature, also left unclear the 
question whether its strictures were to be extended to congressional 
and local redistricting. At least in the latter instance, an answer 
appeared to be shortly forthcoming. Late in 1966, the Court enter-
tained appeals from four local government reapportionment cases. 
However, by dismissing on technical jurisdictional grounds the two 
· appeals directly concerned with Reynolds' applicability to county-
wide governing bodies,47 the Court avoided a resolution of this 
40. 385 U.S. at 442-43. The house figures were a population-variance ratio of 1.41 
to I, with a total deviation of 33.55%. 
41. 385 U.S. at 445. 
42. 385 U.S. at 445. 
43. 385 U.S. at 445. 
44. Swann's tightening of Reynolds is best observed by the fact that the rejection 
of the Florida plan implied invalidation of the post-Reynolds judically approved plans 
in nearly half the states. For a discussion of the Court's elucidation of mathematical 
contours, see R. DIXON, supra note 3, at 445. 
45. 385 U.S. at 444. 
46. 385 U.S. at 444. 
47. Moody v. Flowers, 887 U.S. 97 (1967), dismissing appeals from Moody v. 
Flowers, 256 1'". Supp. 195 (M.D. Ala. 1966), and Bianchi v. Griffing, 256 F. Supp. 617 
(E.D.N.Y. 1966) (see note 23 supra). Both cases had been originally tried by three• 
judge panels convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). Direct review was rejected by 
the Supreme Court because these cases involved "local" law rather than a law of 
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problem. The Justices did cautiously venture into the local govern-
ment area by deciding the other two cases on their merits. This 
excursion was purposely limited as the exact question "whether the 
apportionment of municipal or county legislative agencies is gov-
erned by Reynolds" was specifically reserved.48 
In the first of these cases, Sailors v. Board of Education,49 the 
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Kent County, Michi-
gan, school board. The board was not chosen directly by the elec-
torate but rather by representatives of the local school boards, who 
were popularly elected in their home districts. Since each local 
board, regardless of the size of its constituency, sent only one dele-
gate to the biennial meeting that selected the county body, the peti-
tioners alleged that the "one man-one vote" principle was being 
violated. The Court finessed the question of Reynolds' applicability 
by holding its principles inapposite since the county school board's 
membership was basically appointive rather than elective and since 
the board performed essentially administrative rather than legislative 
functions. 50 
In the second case, Dusch v. Davis,51 the Court -evaluated the 
constitutionality of the government of the City of Virginia Beach, 
Virginia. This recently consolidated body was the result of the merg-
ing of the governments of the city and the adjoining Princess Anne 
County. Four of the new legislature's eleven members were elected 
at large without regard to their residence. The other seven were 
similarly elected at large. However, each of these seven was required 
to reside in a different borough of the new city-thereby entitling 
each of the seven political subdivisions to a resident representative. 52 
Thus, even when it assumed the applicability of "one man-one vote" 
to the new government, the Court upheld its constitutionality. The 
majority reasoned that the city-wide election process made each rep-
resentative "the city's, not the borough's, councilman."53 Absent 
state-wide application and should have been initiated before a single judge. Also, an 
intermediate review by a federal court of appeals was necessary prior to any final 
disposition by the Supreme Court. 387 U.S. at 103-04. 
48. Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 114 (1967), revg. 361 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1966). 
49. 387 U.S. 105 (1967). 
50. 387 U.S. at 109-10. The population disparity among the local school districts 
was astronomical. The City of Grand Rapids delegate represented 201,777 people. The 
four smallest school districts' populations ranged from 99 to 145. R. D1xoN, supra 
note 3, at 547. 
51. 387 U.S. 112 (1967). 
52. 387 U.S. at 114. 
53. 387 U.S. at 115. The Court's reasoning followed closely its allowance of residence 
requirements for the election of state· senators from a multidistrict county in Fortson 
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). Therein the Court stated that since a senator's "tenure 
depends upon the county-wide electorate he must be vigilant to serve the interests of 
all the people in the county, and not merely those of people in his home district; thus 
in fact he is the county's and not merely the district's senator." 379 U.S. at 438. 
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this unique aspect of the scheme, the Reynolds principle would have 
required the invalidation of the program since the boroughs' pop-
ulations ranged from 733 to 29,048.54 However, these figures were 
extraneous to the Court's decision since each legislator necessarily 
represented an equal number of people (the city's entire popula-
tion), and "one man-one vote" was therefore satisfied. 
After having skillfully avoided the question of the applicability 
of Reynolds to local governments during its 1967 term, the Court 
abandoned its prior hesitancy by reviewing Avery v. Midland 
County,55 a Texas decision that had struck down a malapportioned 
local government. In affirming the invalidation of the selection pro-
cess of the Commissioners Court of Midland County, the Supreme 
Court adopted the reasoning of those lower courts that had pre-
viously deemed "one man-one vote" applicable at the local leve1.ao 
Thus, in Avery, Justice White said that "[t]he Equal Protection 
Clause reaches the exercise of state power however manifested, 
whether exercised directly or through subdivisions of the State."a7 
The majority refused to limit their ruling to local governments that 
are strictly "legislative."58 They recognized that the functions of the 
Commissioners Court, like those of most local governing bodies, 
cannot be easily "classified in the neat categories favored by civics 
texts."59 The tasks assigned these governmental units represent a 
conglomeration of classical legislative, executive, administrative, and 
judicial services. Rather than distinguish among these bodies on 
such an artificial basis, the Avery Court held Reynolds applicable to 
any "unit with general governmental powers over an entire geo-
graphic area."00 Governments encompassed by Avery could "not be 
apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal 
population."61 In enunciating this standard, the Supreme Court 
specifically rejected the Texas supreme court's contention that the 
"number of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county 
roads and taxable values"62 were proper factors to be considered in 
the reapportionment process. At the same time, Avery was not in-
tended, as the Court's reaffirmance of Sailors and Dusch indicates, 
to be a roadblock "in the path of innovation, experiment, and devel-
opment among units of local government."63 
54. 387 U.S. at 117 n.5. 
55. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
56. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text. 
57. 390 U.S. at 479. 
58. 390 U.S. at 482. 
59. 390 U .s. at 482. 
60. 390 U.S. at 485-86. 
61. 390 U.S. at 486. 
62. 390 U.S. at 478. 
63. 390 U.S. at 485. The dissents of Justices Harlan and Fortas highlight some 
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After the extension in Avery ·of- the "as nearly as practicable" 
principle, the Court went on to elucidate its meaning. In Kirk-
patrick v. Preisler,64 the first of two 1969 opinions on congressional 
redistricting, the Court rejected defendant Missouri's contention 
that the 5.97% population deviation existing among its congressional 
seats was small enough to be considered de minimis and thereby 
automatically satisfy the constitutional command. The Court again 
refused to establish any fixed numerical standard that might en-
courage legislators to settle for particular percentage deviations and 
sacrifice the concept of constructing legislative districts "as nearly 
as practicable" equal in population.65 Rather than adopt any per se 
rule, the Court reiterated that every deviation would be scrutinized 
with "regard to the circumstances of each particular case.''66 The 
circumstances of Kirkpatrick negated Missouri's assertion of the 
requisite good-faith effort to achieve population equality. First, the 
Missouri legislature relied on inaccurate census data to apportion 
the seats. Even using such data, map-makers could have better ap-
proximated numerical equality by simply transferring political sub-
divisions of known population between contiguous districts. In 
addition, an alternative plan, which would have markedly reduced 
the population disparities, was rejected by the legislators without 
consideration. 67 In short, to the Kirkpatrick Court, it seemed, as it 
had to the Swann majority, " 'quite obvious that the State could 
have come much closer to providing districts of equal popula-
tion.' "68 
Simultaneously with Kirkpatrick, the Court struck down New 
York's districting legislation in the case of Wells v. Rockefeller.69 
The New York scheme treated certain sections of the State as "homo-
geneous" regions and divided them into congressional districts of 
reasons for the Court's prior hesitancy to delve directly into the local government 
area. Justice Harlan, noting the administrative problems and judicial burdens imposed 
by the application of "one man-one vote" to the fifty state legislatures, questioned the 
logic of extending it to some 80,000 units of local government. 390 U.S. at 489-90. 
Justice Fortas paid great attention to the "complexities of local government." 390 U.S. 
at 499. Fortas argued that many local governments, and certainly the Midland County's 
Commissioners Court, because of their often limited and specialized functions and 
powers, do not vest in all their voters the same rights and interests. He felt the equal 
protection requirement to be relevant only if the substance of the citizens' rights and 
interests are equal. Therefore Fortas concluded that Reynolds should be applied only 
to those governing units having an "essentially equal impact upon all the citizens 
within its geographical jurisdiction" and not to local governments per se. 390 U.S. at 
500 n.5. 
64. 394 U.S. 526 (1969). 
65. 394 U.S. at 531. 
66. 394 U.S. at 530. 
67. 394 U.S. at 532. See Recent Development, 15 V1LL. L. REv. 223, 228-33 (1969). 
68. 394 U.S. at 532, quoting Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 445 (1967). 
69. 394 U.S. 542 (1969). 
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virtually identical populations. Thirty-one seats were apportioned 
in accord with this regional principle; another ten districts were 
composed of groupings of whole counties. This approach produced 
a total population deviation of 13.l %,70 The Court found the State's 
interest in keeping intact those "regions with distinct interests" an 
inadequate justification for so large a population disparity.71 The 
Court also invalidated the legislation because of New York's mis-
placed priorities in apportioning its congressional seats: 
The general command, of course, is to equalize population in 
all the districts of the State and is not satisfied by equalizing popu• 
lation only within defined sub-states. New York could not and does 
not claim that the legislature made a good-/ aith effort to achieve 
precise mathematical equality among its 41 congressional districts.72 
Thus, the 1969 Kirkpatrick and Wells decisions represent the 
Supreme Court's most recent attempts to guide legislative map• 
makers in achieving the Reynolds goal of fair and effective represen• 
tation. The basic measurement of the acceptability of apportionment 
plans had been established as the "as nearly as practicable" crite-
rion, which was most commonly expressed in terms of a percentage 
deviation or a mathematical ratio. By the time the petitioners in 
Abate were granted certiorari in February 1970,73 the preceding 
reapportionment cases had developed the standard that "only the 
limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-
faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is 
shown"74 are allowable under the Constitution. 
In order to use this standard to evaluate the constitutionality of 
Plan B's 11.9% population deviation in Abate, the Supreme Court 
70. 394 U.S. at 549. The maximum deviation above the ideal population was 6.488%, 
and that below was 6.608%, Therefore, the total deviation was 13.1 %· 
71. 394 U.S. at 546. 
72. 394 U.S. at 546 (emphasis added). 
73. 397 U.S. 904 (1970). Petitioners June Molof et al., members of the League of 
Women Voters, had been granted leave to intervene as party plaintiffs on April 16, 
1969. Brief for Petitioners June Molof et al. at 7, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), 
On July 9, 1969, the day immediately following the Board's presentation of Plan B 
to the Rockland County court, Cornelius T. O'Sullivan, Ichabod F. Scott, and Michael 
J. Clarke, residents of underrepresented Orangetown (see note 36 supra) were also 
permitted to intervene as party plaintiffs. Id. at 8. Also during 1970, the Court ex• 
tended the Avery doctrine to make Reynolds applicable to the election of trustees 
to a junior college school district. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970). 
74. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969). In Kirkpatrick, Missouri un-
successfully offered as justification for the existing population disparities among its 
congressional districts the following items: "[R]epresentation of distinct interest groups, 
the integrity of county lines, the compactness of districts, the population trends 
within the State, the high proportion of military personnel, college students, and 
other nonvoters in some districts, and the political realities of 'legislative interplay.'" 
394 U.S. at 530. The Court, in an action reminiscent of its handling of Swann (see 
text accompanying note 46 supra), suggested that justifications for population dis• 
parities do exist but did not elaborate on what they might be. 
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had to scrutinize carefully the state interests offered to justify the 
deviation. 75 The defendant Board of Supervisors attempted to justify 
the disparity on grounds of a great need for "intergovernmental 
coordination" at the local level and the ability of this plan to satisfy 
that necessity by fostering "extensive functional interrelationships" 
between the county and its component towns.76 The Court, however, 
was hesitant to accept this aspect of Plan B by itself as sufficient justi-
fication for the deviation. Therefore, it was significant to the A bate 
majority that "Rockland County has long recognized the advantages 
of having the same individuals occupy the governing positions of 
both the county and its towns."77 The Court emphasized Plan B's 
ability to facilitate membership by the town supervisors on the 
county board through the plan's preservation of an "exact correspon-
dence between each town and one of the county legislative dis-
tricts. "78 On the basis of the "long tradition of overlapping function 
and dual personnel in Rockland County government,"79 the Court 
found the 11.9% population deviation among the constituencies of 
the Rockland County Legislature to be constitutionally acceptable.80 
II. THE .AFTERMATH OF ABATE 
IN ROCKLAND COUNTY 
The stated purpose of the "reapportionment revolution" was to 
achieve "fair and effective representation for all citizens."81 Prior to 
the Supreme Court's final determination of Abate, neither the fair-
ness nor the effectiveness of the Rockland County government had 
been noticeably improved by the various reapportionment proposals. 
It is not altogether clear that the Court's decision in Abate has con-
tributed to the attainment of this goal. 
A. Stability of the Rockland 
County Legislature 
The long and tumultuous process of commission reports, public 
referenda, and time-consuming and expensive litigation suggests that 
75. 403 U.S. at 185-87. Although the Court apparently used the most recent re-
apportionment standard set out in Kirkpatrick and Wells, Justice Marshall's majority 
opinion cites neither case. Perhaps the conspicuous absence of Kirkpatrick and Wells 
can be explained by the Court's reaction to the criticisms leveled at the two opinions. 
See authorities cited in note 90 infra. 
76. 403 U.S. at 186. 
77. 403 U.S. at 186. 
78. 403 U.S. at 187. 
79. 403 U.S. at 187. 
80. The Rockland County Legislature, created by Plan B, had replaced the Board 
of Supervisors as the county's governing body in January 1970. The Journal News, 
June 8, 1971, at 1, col. 1. 
81. See text accompanying note 18 supra. 
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the "reapportionment revolution" was not producing better govern-
ment for the people of Rockland County. During the interval be-
tween Lodico and the inauguration of the new legislators in January 
1970, the county was governed by a judicially invalidated body. 
However, the lack of finality of the lower court decisions precluded 
even the new government from operating at full efficiency. The 
legislators, although elected for a four-year term, worked constantly 
under the threat of a new court-ordered election. This lack of cer-
tainty about their position inhibited the legislators' potential to 
provide meaningful government. An apparent prerequisite to better 
representation was an end to the litigation and the creation of a gov-
erning body with a solid foundation. 
The importance of this need for governmental stability to the 
Court's decision to legitimize the new legislative body is unclear. 
Whether or not motivated by a concern for stability, the A bate deci-
sion did create Rockland County's first judicially sanctioned govern-
ment in over five years. One immediate impact of the approval of 
Plan B was to overcome the uncertainty about the future of the 
legislature previously felt by its members and the public.82 However, 
despite this initial gain, Abate's long-range effect may well be the 
perpetuation of the instability that had previously been detrimental 
to the legislature's operations. Although the Abate majority was will-
ing to accept, in the circumstances of this case, a population devia-
tion of 11.9%, it indicated that any larger disparity would be 
suspect: "[N]othing we say today . . . could justify substantially 
greater deviations from population equality."83 
Serious questions about the government's future validity exist 
because deviations of greater than 11.9% are almost an inherent 
feature of the scheme. Chief Judge Fuld dissented from the decision 
in the New York Court of Appeals because of the potential for 
gross inequality in representation under Plan B: 
[I]f the population of each of the towns happens to approximate an 
integral multiple of that of Stony Point-as it does under the 1969 
census-then, the deviation will be relatively small-for example, 
as in this case, 12%, More typically, however, the formula will re-
quire a rounding off of large fractions and will result, accordingly, 
in very much greater deviation.84 
82. The Journal News, June 8, 1971, at 1, col. 1. 
B"3. 403 U.S. at 187. 
84. 25 N.Y.2d at 322 n.2, 253 N.E.2d at 196 n.2, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 474 n,2 (emphasis 
original). Judge Fuld further elaborated: 
The potential for inequality inherent in the plan becomes even more apparent 
when one considers that an increase of only 3,000 in the population of Stony 
Point, assuming that the populations of the other towns remain constant, would 
change the deviation from the present 12% to approximately 47%, In fact, it is 
theoretically possible for a plan such as the one before us to result in deviations 
approaching 100%. And, since the plan rigidly fixes district lines-providing for 
no variation-there is no way to compensate' for or minimize such extreme 
deviations. 
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Obviously the deviation in any apportionment scheme will vary as 
the census figures change. If the disparity grows too great, reappor-
tionment will be necessary. The distinguishing feature, therefore, of 
Plan B is the unique problem it creates when reapportionment is 
necessary. The typical government's adjustment process to malappor-
tionment is at least theoretically simple. Within the existing govern-
mental structure, district lines can be redrawn to reduce the popula-
tion disparities. In Rockland County, this corrective technique is 
not feasible. The core of Plan B is the correspondence of legislative 
districts and town boundaries. Any shifting of district lines would 
disrupt this desired relationship. Therefore, the traditional adjust-
ment procedure is not possible within the existing legislative frame-
work of Rockland County. Reapportionment can only be accom-
plished by a complete restructuring of the government. 
Plan B's future deviations will be limited to 11.9% only if all 
the towns grow at the same rate. The census data indicate that this 
occurrence is unlikely. Between 1960 and 1970, the differentials in 
the towns' growth rates ranged from Orangetown's 24.0% to Ram-
apo's 118.7%.85 The county planning board projects a similar spey-
trum of unequal population gains for the 1970-1985 period.86 Today 
the foundation of the Rockland County Legislature is perhaps as 
shaky as it ever was. The inevitable population changes will subject 
it to constitutional attack each time "deviations greater than 11.9% 
occur. These challenges need not be successful to frustrate the work-
ings of the government. The mere existence of pending litigation 
and its inherent threat of drastic governmental structural change (as 
experienced prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Abate) will 
suffice to impede the practical effectiveness of the legislature. There-
fore, to the extent that the Supreme Court attempted to promote 
fair and effective representation by providing for a more stable gov-
ernment, its achievement is at best illusory. 
B. Multimember Districting and 
Fair and Effective Representation 
Absolute mathematical equality between legislative districts is 
not necessarily synonymous with better government. Political scien-
tist William M. Beaney maintains that, given the realities of the 
legislative process, attempts to achieve precise equality will not pro-
duce any better result than will substantial equality-i.e., 5-10 per 
25 N.Y.2d at 322, 253 N.E.2d at 196, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 474. The Supreme Court recog• 
nized the contention that "the Rockland County plan may produce substantially 
greater deviations than presently exist," but reserved its opinion for the future. Its 
deference, however, almost extends an open invitation to future litigants: "Such ques-
tions can be answered if and when it becomes necessary to do so." 403 U.S. at 186 n.3. 
85. ROCKLAND COUl\'TY PLANNING BOARD, ROCKLAND COUNTY DATA BOOK 38. (1971). 
•u . 
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cent deviation.s7 In fact, depending on the structure of the legislative 
map, an unnecessarily strict adherence to the "one man-one vote" 
principle may impede effective representation. The Illinois 1964 at 
large election for its lower house is, of course, the classic example 
of meaningful representation being frustrated by an insistence on 
mathematical perfection.ss In addition, there is some belief that an 
absolute-equality standard facilitates the task of any "gerrymander-
minded" map-maker.so 
From its decision in Baker through Kirkpatrick and Wells, the 
Court had promulgated successively stricter standards for reappor-
tioning legislative bodies. This apparent progression toward a de-
mand for an absolute-equality standard is open to severe criticism.00 
Judicial evaluations of legislative apportionments must involve more 
than just "simplistic formula[e] based on numbers alone."01 Abate 
therefore presented the Court with an opportunity to re-emphasize 
Reynolds' admonition that "one man-one vote" is merely the means 
to achieve the desired end of fair and effective representation. Un-
fortunately, the Abate majority's approval of Plan B's multimember 
districts92 relegates this ultimate goal to a lower position than even 
the severest critics of the Kirkpatrick and Wells decisions had ever 
imagined. 
The dynamics of multimember districts, such as those introduced 
into Rockland County, are inherently inimical to the goal of fair 
representation. Professor Josephine King contends that their use 
raises "important problems in democratic government."93 Professor 
Robert Dixon strongly criticizes any remedy that includes at large 
87. Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote", 
1969 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 219, 232. 
88. See R. D1xoN, supra note 3, at 302-03. In actuality, this at large election was 
not the result of the "one man-one vote" movement, Rather, it resulted from the 
equal-population district mandate of a 1954 amendment to the Illinois Constitution. 
Id. 
89. This point was strongly debated in Kirkpatrick and Wells. The Kir!,patrick 
majority, citing A. HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING 59 (1964 rev. ed.), noted that 
a requirement of equal-population districts severely inhibits the political cartographer's 
freedom to gerrymander. 394 U.S. at 534 &: n.4. Justice Harlan, dissenting in both 
cases, felt quite strongly that the opposite is true: "[T]he rule of absolute equality 
. is perfectly compatible with 'gerrymandering' of the worst sort," 394 U.S. at 551. 
90. E.g., Dixon, supra note 87, at 219-43; Dixon &: McKay, Election Districts: Sub-
stantial Population Equality, and Exceeded Expectations, I HUMAN RIGHTS 74 (1970); 
Hill, The Reapportionment Decisions: A Return to Dogma1, 31 J. PoL. 186 (1969); 
Recent Case, 35 Mo. L R.Ev. 246, 250-51 (1970). 
91. Dixon &: McKay, supra note 90, at 80. 
92. Plan B is a typical multimember legislative scheme. Four of the five districts 
are represented by more than one legislatot. Each official, whether his area's sole 
representative or just one of several, is elected at large in the district, See notes 28 &: 
35-36 supra and accompanying text. 
93. King, The Reynolds Standard and Local Reapportionment, 15 BUFFALO L. R.Ev, 
120, 123 (1965). 
January 1972] Notes 601 
elections, which are the very basis of any multimember scheme: "An 
election at large ... is not a remedy in the sense of being an alterna-
tive and better representation system. From the standpoint of rep-
resentation, it creates more problems than it solves."94 In multimeni-
ber districts, the voter is faced with a longer and more confusing 
ballot.9l'i The candidate, facing an enlarged electorate, has greater 
campaign demands placed upon his time and money. As a result, the 
voter is often less familiar with each individual office seeker. This 
process de-emphasizes both the candidate's personality and his in-
volvement in local affairs and forces the less knowledgeable and 
somewhat confused voter to rely more heavily upon the candidate's 
party affiliation. Furthermore, slight majorities within multimember 
districts often elect legislators that may not adequately represent 
significant but not predominant social, economic, geographic, or 
racial interests within the district.96 
In Whitcomb v. Chavis,97 a case decided concurrently with 
Abate, the Court recognized several unfavorable aspects of Indiana's 
multimember districting system for its state legislature,98 but was 
not willing, on the facts of the case, to declare multimember dis-
tricts "inherently invidious and violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."99 However, the refusal of the Whitcomb majority to strike 
down multimember districting schemes per se did not automatically 
preclude the Abate court from invalidating Plan B. In Whitcomb, 
the Supreme Court was willing to permit Indiana's continued use of 
multimember districts but sustained the district court's order to 
redistrict the state, an order which was in part designed to correct a 
population disparity of 24.78% among the existing house districts.100 
Therefore, Whitcomb's allowance of multimember districts was 
limited to a legislative structure in which population deviations 
among the districts are adjustable by means of the normal redistrict-
94. Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional 
Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REv. 209, 228 (1964). 
95. The Supreme Court recognized this troublesome aspect of multimember district-
ing in the Lucas case. 377 U.S. at 731. 
96. King, supra note 93, at 123. 
97. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
98. We are not insensitive to the objections long voiced to multi-member district 
plans. • • • Criticism is rooted in their winner-take-all aspects, their tendency to 
submerge minorities and to overrepresent the winning party as compared with the 
party's statewide electoral position, a general preference for legislatures reflecting 
community interests as closely as possible and disenchantment with political par-
ties and elections as devices to settle policy differences between contending interests. 
The chance of winning or significantly influencing intraparty fights and issue-
oriented elections has seemed to some inadequate protection to minorities, politi-
cal, racial, or economic; rather, their voice, it is said, should also be heard in thu 
legislative forum where public policy is finally fashioned. 
403 U.S. at 157-59. 
99. 403 U.S. at 160. 
100. 403 U.S. at 161-63; 
.602 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:586 
.ing process. Plan B's unique .structural aspect effectively negates the 
possibility of correcting such deviations in Rockland County by the 
conventional method. Rather, its insistence on the preservation of 
town boundaries and utilization of them as the boundaries of the 
multimember legislative districts locks the population disparities 
into the very structure of the government.101 
The A bate court disposed of the petitioners' challenge to Plan 
B's multimember scheme in a single footnote.102 The lack of appreci-
ation of this crucial aspect of the reapportionment scheme belies the 
Court's devotion to its espoused goal of achieving fair and effective 
.representation. This analytical shortcoming, discomforting when ob-
served within the context of a developing constitutional doctrine, is 
even more so when one realizes its actual impact on Rockland 
County government.103 
III. THE COURTS ANALYTICAL FAILURES 
IN .ABATE 
The Abate decision resulted in part from the Court's failure to 
apply an established reapportionment criterion and to comprehend 
the underlying political basis of Plan B. In its opinion, the Court 
improperly ignored the map-makers' lack of good faith, while it 
wrongly emphasized their political preference. 
A. The Neglected Good-Faith Requirement 
Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Abate defended Rockland 
County's 11.9% population variance with the statement from Reyn-
olds that" '[m]athematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable 
constitutional requirement.' "104 In £act, Reynolds and its progeny 
101. See note 84 supra and accompanying text. 
102. 403 U.S. at 184 n.2. The Abate Court considered multimember districting 
relevant only if the plaintiffs could show that the districting scheme by itself "oper• 
ate[s] to impair the voting strength of particular racial or political elements," 403 U.S. 
at 184 n.2. 
The Court's quick disposal of this multimember district issue becomes even more 
shocking when it is compared to Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971), decided just 
four days prior to Abate. In Connor, a three-judge district court had reluctantly per• 
mitted Mississippi to establish a multimember legislative district in Hinds County. 
The lower court voiced a strong preference to have the county's scats apportioned 
among single-member districts. However, in light of the lack of the time available be-
fore the statutory deadline for filing notices of candidacy, the court felt it impossible 
to properly construct single-member districts and therefore countenanced the Hinds 
County multimembcr district for the 1971 election. However, the Court, despite a vigo• 
rous dissent by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Harlan (402 U.S. at 693), 
noted that single-member districts arc a preferable judicial remedy for reapportion• 
ment and extended Mississippi's filing date for candidates so that the district court 
would have sufficient time to "devise and put into effect a single-member district plan 
for Hinds County." 402 U.S. at 692. 
103. See note 159 infra. 
104. 403 U.S. at 185, quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). 
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command only that legislative districts be of "as nearly of equal pop-
ulation as is practicable."105 The cases do dictate, though, that the 
state "make an honest and good faith effort"106 to comply with this 
constitutional standard. Several features of Plan B's implementation 
suggest that the Board of Supervisors could have come much closer 
than they did to providing districts of equal population. Yet Justice 
Marshall's opinion is conspicuously devoid of any mention of the 
good-faith obligation. Only the dissenting Justices Brennan and 
Douglas inquired into this aspect of the equal protection mandate.107 
Among the indicia of the Board's noncompliance with the good-
faith requirement, perhaps the most prominent is the Supervisors' 
persistent refusal to consider an alternative proposal that would have 
substantially reduced the population disparity. It was the Board's 
failure to act on the 1967 commission's reproposal of Plan S that 
prompted Abate to initiate his suit in late 1968. Plan S, revised to 
account for the latest census data (as was Plan B when it was finally 
adopted in 1969), would have produced a population variation of 
only 3.5% by utilizing eighteen single-member districts.108 The exis-
tence of an alternative plan, yielding a lower disparity ratio, has 
been a strong indication that legislators have not fulfilled their good-
faith obligations in redistricting. For instance, in Swann, the plain-
tiffs had proposed an alternative scheme; the Court, although 
recognizing the possible imperfections in the proposal, regarded its 
existence as a significant factor in evaluating the defendant's program. 
The very suggestion of an alternative demonstrated that closer ap-
proximations to the mandated norm were at least feasible.109 Like-
wise, in Kirkpatrick, the Missouri General Assembly's rejection of a 
reapportionment plan that established districts with only slight popu-
lation variances was one of the factors the Court considered in evalu-
ating the defendants' compliance with the good-faith requirement.11° 
Abate must stand in sharp contrast to its predecessors since the up-
dated Plan S apparently did not warrant the Abate majority's con-
sideration. 
Had the Court inquired into the possible reasons for the Board's 
rejection of this and other alternative plans, another possible infer-
105. 377 U.S. at 577. 
106. 377 U.S. at 577. 
107. Justices Brennan and Douglas relied on Wells and would have reversed: 
The plan here allegedly represents as close to mathematical exactness as is pos-
sible without changing existing political boundaries or using weighted or frac-
tional votes. But a plan devised under these constraints is not devised in the 
good-faith effort that the Constitution requires. In Wells v. Rockefeller .•• we 
struck down a similar plan. 
403 U.S. at 187, 188. 
108. Brief for Petitioners Cornelius T. O'Sullivan et al. at 19, Abate v. Mundt, 403 
U.S. 182 (1971). 
109. 385 U.S. at 445-46. 
110. 394 U.S. at 529, 531-32. 
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ence about the defendants' lack of good faith might have emerged. 
An analysis of the history of the county's reapportionment suggests 
that the Board's selection of Plan B-supposedly made to preserve the 
traditional interrelationship between the towns and county govern-
ment-may have been primarily dictated by the legislators' own 
self-interests.111 First, an incumbent town supervisor running for a 
seat on the county body has an inherent advantage since his con-
stituency for both posts is exactly the same and his name (as super-
visor) will already be well known to the same people who vote for 
him as a county legislator. The possibility that self-preservation was 
an overriding motive is further suggested by the Board of Super-
visors' initial proposal, which would have permitted their appoint-
ment to the county legislature ex officio. The Board's successive 
appeals of the trial court's exclusion of that provision emphasizes 
their desire to maintain dual roles.112 An analysis of the extent to 
which this selfishness tainted any attempt to create equal-population 
districts should have played an integral part in the Court's evaluation 
of the plan in its totality. Previously, other courts have considered 
evidence of illicit motives when appraising the constitutionality of 
reapportionment schemes. In League of Nebraska Municipalities v. 
Marsh,113 a congressional-districting proposal, apparently written 
with a view toward keeping incumbent representatives in office, was 
rejected for violating the Reynolds requirements.114 An alternative 
Jll. The selection of Plan B by the reapportionment commission as its recom• 
mendation to the Board also hints at improper activity by the defendants. Initially, 
the commission had approved a Plan S-type, eighteen-man legislature with single-
member districts. At the last minute, the group reverted to the multimember dis-
tricting plan. In protest, an opposition report was filed. One of the dissenters blamed 
the "pressure" brought upon some of his fellow commissioners as the reason for the 
sudden switch. The Journal News, June 18, 1969, at 17, col. I. 
112. See Brief for Petitioner Samuel J. Abate, at 12, 14, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 
182 (1971). 
113. 242 F. Supp. 357 (D. Neb. 1965), appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 1021 (1966), 
114. 242 F. Supp. at 360-61. The emphasis that a judicial evaluation of legislative 
acts should place on the representatives' motivations is a controversial issue. Marsh's 
evaluation of the map-makers' motives was criticized because "traditional constitutional 
analysis would require that if deviations can be explained by rational and 'legitimate' 
considerations, then a plan should be constitutional regardless of a selfish interest of 
the legislators." Note, supra note IO, at 1248. Indeed, the Court has often explicitly 
stated that motivation is irrelevant to constitutional questions. See, e.g., United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114-16 (1941); Sozinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 
(1937). However, Professor John Hart Ely contends that these "rejections" of consti-
tutional motivational challenges are just dicta. He states that the Court will sum-
marily dismiss this argument "only in situations where the law under attack can be 
defended in constitutionally legitimate terms." Ely, Motivation in Constitutional Law, 
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1222 (1970). Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), 
introduced a line of cases that support Ely's belief that legislative motivation is an 
issue in constitutional adjudication. Schempp's contribution was the "purpose or elfect" 
test used to determine the validity of a statute affecting religious freedom: "[T]o with• 
stand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative 
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 874 U.S. at 
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proposal that would have diminished the disparities between districts· 
was unacceptable to the map-makers as it would have retired four or 
five of the incumbents. The court soundly rejected this "justifica-
tion": "The goal of reapportionment ... is just representation of the 
people, not the protection of the incumbents in a legislative body."1115 
The Supreme Court, while never ruling directly on the question, has 
indicated a strong disapproval of this self-preservation motive. In 
Dusch, the Court indicated that it would not accept "an evasive 
scheme to avoid the consequences of reapportionment or to perpetu-
ate certain persons in office."116 
A Supreme Court invalidation of Plan B based on the Supervisors' 
absence of good faith would not have constituted a radical depar-
ture from existing reapportionment standards. However, the A bate 
Court's refusal to consider the Board's possible lack of good faith can 
only reinforce the criticism that the essence of reapportionment doc-
trine is little more than a "simplistic formula based on numbers 
alone."117 
B. The Unwise and Unnecessary Choice 
The Board of Supervisors' selection of Plan B affected the distri-
bution of political and governmental power in Rockland County. Its 
preservation of town boundaries retained most of this power within 
the individual tmvns. The alternative Plan S, with its single-member 
districts not inherently aligned with the towns, would permit each 
legislator to look beyond the borders of his own town and thereby 
would create a more "county" legislature.118 
In determining the constitutionality of Plan B, the Court need 
222. Justice White, dissenting in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 240 (1971), con• 
curs with Professor Ely's analysis. He attacks the "majority's assertion that it is im-
permissible to impeach the othenvise valid act of closing municipal swimming pools 
by resort to evidence of invidious purpose or motive." 403 U.S. at 241. White cites 
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), as standing "for the proposition that 
the reasons underlying certain official acts are highly relevant in assessing the consti• 
tutional validity of those acts." 403 U.S. at 264. White also considers legislative motive 
an integral part of the judicial evaluation of a reapportionment scheme. "'But there 
is no suggestion here that Marion County's multi-member district, or similar districts 
throughout the State, were conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further ra• 
cial or economic discrimination.' " 403 U.S. at 242-43, quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 
403 U.S. 124, 149 (1970) (emphasis added by Justice White). 
115. 242 F. Supp. at 360. 
116. 387 U.S. at 116 (emphasis added). 
117. Dixon & McKay, supra note 90, at 80. 
118. Michael H. Prendergast, former State Democratic Chairman and a Rockland 
County resident, ·opposed Plan B because of its retention of the Supervisors' "township 
empires." He vigorously endorsed Plan S because of its strong central government. He 
considered its dominant advantage to be the ability of each of its legislators to think 
in terms of benefiting the entire county and not just his particular town. The Record 
(Bergen County, N.J., Rockland County, N.Y. ed.), Oct. 20, 1966, § C, at 1, col. I. 
606, Michigan Law Review l:Vol, 70:li86 
not have considered the relative merits of either of these political 
orientations. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Baker, had explicitly 
warned against choosing between "competing theories of political 
philosophy."119 Unfortunately, by basing their decision on "the long 
tradition of overlapping function and dual personnel in Rockland 
County government,"120 the majority, perhaps unknowingly, entered 
the "political thicket." Had they not thought it so important to 
continue "to encourage town supervisors to serve on the county 
board,"121 the Justices probably would not have sanctioned the exact 
correspondence between each town and one of the county legislative 
districts that produced the 11.9% population disparity among Plan 
B's multimember districts. The Abate Court did more than just ap-
prove a legislative preference for a government of town rather than 
county orientation; it permitted this choice to serve as the constitu-
tional justification for an otherwise impermissible percentage devia-
tion. 
What was so compelling about encouraging town supervisors to 
serve on the coun,ty board that the Court was willing to accept an 
almost 12% deviation? It seems that the Court was persuaded by the 
respondents' strenuous urging that "the county's rapidly expanding 
population ha[ d] amplified the need for town and county coordina-
tion . . . .''122 In view of the greatly increased demand for county 
services, this point is undebatable. The Board, however, argued that 
the continuation of a direct voice in the performance of county 
government for the towns was an absolute prerequisite to such co-
operation.123 However, the necessity for an institutional interrelation-
ship as the catalytic agent for this desired cooperation is unclear. 
Having the same individual serve simultaneously at both levels 
119. ll69 U.S. at ll00. 
120. 403 U.S. at 187. 
121. 403 U.S. at 187. This "encouragement" for town supervisors to serve on the 
county legislative body by the Abate majority is rather interesting. The desirability 
of having town officials serve simultaneously as county legislators has been seriously 
questioned: It has been argued that their dual positions build serious conflicts of 
interest into the system. The supervisor on the county board is just one of several 
legislator-executives, while in his town he is the chief executive officer. This position 
in the town offers the supervisor the most power and therefore he will often find it 
the more attractive of his positions. Such a supervisor is content, therefore, to keep 
the county ineffective and impotent to challenge the towns. Conflicts will arise be-
tween what the supervisor conceives to be the needs of his town's residents and those 
of the county as a whole. One obvious solution to this problem is to cut apart the 
supervisors' two functions. Weinstein, supra note 20, at 29 n.35. Weinstein has sug-
gested that doing so might "produce a more rational-a!}d less costly-system of local 
government." Id. 
122. 403 U.S. at 183. 
123. The county's attorney argued that this cooperation had existed under the 
prior government only because "the elected executive served on the County Board of 
Supervisors." Brief for Respondents at 10, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971). Since 
the town supervisors no longer serve ex officio on the county board (see text following 
note 37 supra), this alleged advantage of Plan B may be illusory. 
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arguably would provide readily accessible channels of communication 
between the governments. Yet no other advantages are immediately 
apparent. Certainly there is evidence of cooperation between govern-
ments even in the absence of the structural relationship deemed es-
sential by the Board of Supervisors. Within Rockland County itself 
the villages and special districts cooperate with both the towns and 
the county,124 yet neither are represented directly on any other gov-
erning body. On the national level, cities and counties are not directly 
represented as units in Congress, yet federal programs and grants 
play an integral role in their rendering of services. 
Even if this "town voice" concept is vital, it is unclear why only 
Plan B's multimember districts, tied as they are to the town bounda-
ries, can preserve it. The alternative proposal-Plan S-creates dis-
tricts that cross town boundaries in only three of eighteen instances. 
Since the constituencies of the other :fifteen representatives are all 
residents of one or another of the county's five towns,125 it appears 
that any unique town interest would be heard in the county govern-
ment. In addition, with district lines dra-wn as contemplated in Plan 
S, each town would have at least one representative whose electorate 
would reside wholly within the town. Therefore, each such subunit 
of the county would have at least one voice in the legislature whose 
strength need not be compromised by attempts to appeal to voters in 
the other towns. Consequently, even assuming the necessity for 
perpetuating a town voice, the defendants' argument that Plan B's 
equation of town boundaries and county legislative districts is the 
only means of doing so is unconvincing. The Abate Court, by elevat-
ing this dubious contention into a constitutional justification for an 
11.9% population deviation, compounded its initial error of con-
sidering the relative advantages of either a town- or county-based 
legislature in determining Plan B's constitutionality. 
IV. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ABATE 
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Abate, stated that the decision 
could "have little or no precedential value" for future reapportion-
ment cases because "no other local apportionment scheme can pos-
sibly present the same combination of factors relied on by the 
Court."126 This belief, however, gives too little credit to the ingenuity 
of advocates working in this field. Some of the loose wording reflect-
ing the analytical weaknesses of the Abate opinion will undoubtedly 
be cited in future reapportionment controversies. This, of course, 
presents the danger that justifications /nit~ally intended to be limited 
124. See generally LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 23, at 27-42.· 
125. Brief for Petitioners· Cornelius T. O'Sullivan et al. at 19-28, Abate v. Mundt, 
403 U.S. 182 (1971). 
126. 403 U.S. at 189. 
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to the particular conditions of Rockland County may be seized upon 
by any government to legitimize othenvise impermissible deviations 
from the dictates of Reynolds. 
A. The Variable "As Nearly As Is Practicable" Standard 
The New York Court of Appeals decision presented the Supreme 
Court with a questionable justification for tolerating Abate's 11.9% 
deviation. In rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that Plan B's "mi-
nor" population variance rendered it defective, the New York court 
assumed that different tests should apply to reapportionment cases at 
the national, state, and local levels. These districting schemes, the 
court felt, should be evaluated with variable standards regarding the 
permissible variations from strict equality and the justification for 
these deviations. The New York court's analysis of Supreme Court 
reapportionment cases indicated to it that three distinct tests exist: 
[I]n regard to apportionment of congressional districts, the per-
missible variation from strict equality is indeed almost micrometic 
and the justification required for such deviation is correspondingly 
stringent. Decisions dealing ·with apportionment of State Legislatures 
tend to reflect a broader scope for permissible deviations and a more 
tolerant attitude toward the practical justifications for deviations. 
Similarly, and of particular relevance on this appeal, the Court has 
indicated a willingness to allow a still broader scope for permissible 
deviations from strict population equality and the justifications for 
such deviations when dealing with local, intrastate legislative 
bodies.121 
This variable "as nearly as practicable" standard is pragmatically and 
analytically suspect. 
One important practical aspect of Rockland County's government 
ignored by the New York Court of Appeals was the fact that the new 
legislature is unicameral. In the Lucas case, the Supreme Court sug-
gested that governments with bicameral legislatures might be per-
mitted slightly greater deviations from strict population equality if 
the overrepresentation of a particular area in one chamber was offset 
by a corresponding underrepresentation of the same area in the other 
house.128 Naturally a unicameral structure negates the possibility of 
such offsetting discrepancies. For this reason, stricter standards for 
apportioning unicameral legislative bodies have been proposed120 
127, 24 N.Y.2d at 315, 253 N.E.2d at 191-92, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69. 
128. 377 U.S. at 735 n.27. The deviations in each house may not always compcn• 
sate for each other. The Court in the same footnote added that "disparities from 
population-based representation, though minor, may be cumulative instead of offsetting 
where the same areas are disadvantaged in both houses of a state legislature, and may 
therefore render the app9rtionment scheme at ~east constitutionally suspect." 
129. McKay, Reapportionment and Local Government, 36 GEO. WASH, L. REv. 713, 
728 (1968); Weinstein, supra note 20, at 25. 
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and indeed seem appropriate (assuming that there are no exceptional 
factors involved).13° Congress, although structurally bicameral, should 
be treated as unicameral for reapportionment purposes since devia-
tions among House seats cannot possibly be balanced by adjusting 
the constitutionally fixed Senate districts (the states). In fact, the 
variable-standard concept enunciated by the New Yark court in-
corporates this idea by demanding the strictest application of "one 
man-one vote" at the congressional level. However, by allowing the 
most permissive standard for the reapportionment of Rockland 
County, the court overlooked the significance of the fact that its gov-
ernment is unicameral, as are the overwhelming majority of local 
governments.131 The New York court's per se toleration of greater 
deviations by local governments is therefore contrary to the apparent 
practicalities of reapportionment-at least in regard to unicameral 
legislatures. 
An additional deficiency in the opinion of the New York Court 
of Appeals is its interpretation of the Supreme Court's reapportion-
ment cases. Contrary to the New York court's holding that three 
"one man-one vote" doctrines exist, other courts, in construing these 
same cases, have concluded that the Supreme Court has promulgated 
just one "as nearly as practicable" standard for reapportionment. 
The position of these courts is supported by the fact that the Su-
preme Court has cited congressional districting precedents and state 
legislative apportionment precedents interchangeably on all ques-
tions, including that of the population-equality standard.132 This fact 
was of particular significance to the California supreme court in Cal-
deron v. City of Los Angeles,133 a case involving the reapportionment 
of the Los Angeles City Council, which was decided just prior to 
Abate's final adjudication. The California court suggested that "it has 
never been apparent that the [Supreme] Court .•. [has] produc[ed] 
different yardsticks for districting matters."134 Similarly, in Skolnick v. 
Mayor and City Council of Chicago,135 decided during the interval be-
tween the lower court decision and the Supreme Court's ultimate rul-
130. For a discussion of some possible exceptional factors, see note 142 infra. 
131. Weinstein, supra note 20, at 25. 
132. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531-33 (1969). See also Dixon, 
supra note 87, at 222 & n.16. 
133. 4 Cal. 3d 251, 481 P .2d 489, 93 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1971). The California court 
first explored the possible distinctions between federal and state reapportionment 
standards. It considered the different constitutional bases for these "one man-one vote" 
commands but rejected the theory of a variable test for compliance. The court did not 
even consider the possibility that a unique standard is applicable to local governments. 
Local bodies, like their state counterparts, were felt to be subject to the same four-
teenth amendment standard. 4 Cal. 3d at 267, 481 P.2d at 499-500, 93 Cal. Rptr. ~t 
371-72. 
134. 4 Cal. 3d at 267, 481 P.2d at 500, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872. 
135. 319 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
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ing in A bate, a federal district court specifically rejected the New York 
court's reasoning. Speaking for that court, Chief Judge William J. 
Campbell refused to entertain the theory that "greater deviations are 
permissible in state and local redistricting."136 Rather, he applied the 
Kirkpatrick and Wells standard137 to the case, which involved the 
redistricting of Chicago's municipal government. 
Justice Marshall's statement in Abate that "slightly greater per-
centage deviations may be tolerable for local apportionment 
schemes"138 does not directly sanction the New York court's variable 
standard. However, the Court's affirmance of the lower court holding 
and its failure to reject explicitly the logic thereof invites lawyers to 
argue for, and lower courts to accept the existence of, such a stan-
dard.139 However, upon close examination, the language of the Abate 
majority suggests that the Court permitted Rockland County greater 
leeway in reapportioning, not because of any absolute rule for dis-
tinguishing among local, state, or congressional redistricting schemes, 
but rather because of certain obstacles to achieving mathematical 
equality among districts, which most often characterize local govern-
ments. In appraising Plan B, the Court noted two such considera-
tions: "[L]ocal legislative bodies frequently have fewer representatives 
than do their state and national counterparts and ... some local legis-
lative districts may have a much smaller population than do con-
gressional and state legislative districts .... "140 This evaluation 
recognizes the practical difficulties of adjusting a small population 
disparity among Rockland County legislative districts. Any attempt 
to achieve absolute population equality might entail drawing district 
lines between houses in a residential neighborhood or even between 
floors in an apartment building since small percentage deviations 
136. 319 F. Supp. at 1222. 
137. 319 F. Supp. at 1223. Judge Campbell never considered a separate, more per-
missive test for local governments. He also envisioned the differing constitutional bases 
for state and congressional reapportionment commands as the only possible reason for 
distinguishing their "one man-one vote" standards. 
138. 403 U.S. at 185. 
139. Already lower courts, although not yet directly basing their decisions on this 
point, have indicated that Abate establishes a reapportionment standard for local 
governments different from that existing on the state or federal level. In Wold v. 
Anderson, 327 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mont. 1971), a case involving the reapportionment 
of Montana's legislature, the district court read Abate to say that " 'slightly greater 
percentage deviations may be tolerable for local government apportionment sd1emes' 
than for 'state and national counterparts.' " 327 F. Supp. at 1344. Compare this in-
terpretation with the actual Abate wording in '403 U.S. at 185. Sims v. Amos, •10 
U.S.L.W. 2435 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 3, 1972), offers more evidence of the possible acceptance 
by lower courts of the New York court's variable standard. Citing Abate as authority, 
the •court stated: "[I]n the context of local apportionment, preservation of political 
subdivisions cannot justify a deviation of substantially more than 11.9 per cent; where 
state apportionment sdtemes are at issue less leeway is to be afforded." 40 U.S.L.W. at 
2436. 
140. 403 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added). 
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among limited populations will actually involve very few people. 
The defendants had presented this "practical difficulties". distinction 
to the Court: 
[I]t is one thing to draw district lines to pick up 4,093 people 
[representing a 1% population deviation in a New York congres-
sional district] and another to shift lines to include only 121 people 
[representing a I% population deviation in a Rockland County 
legislative district].141 
This interpretation rejects the New York court's application of a 
more permissive Reynolds standard to all local governments. Rather, 
in evaluating reapportionment schemes, courts should consider the 
absolute population size of the redrawn legislative districts along 
with any peculiarities142 that might rebut the presumption that fair 
and effective representation is best achieved by creating legislative 
districts of equal population. For example, assume that the local 
governing bodies of both Los Angeles County, California, and 
141. Brief for Respondents at 21, Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971). Respondents 
elaborated on this point: 
One apartment house in Rockland County may contain several hundred people. 
Are we to start drawing lines through and around buildings? • • • It is patently 
unworkable to expect that a map should be drawn without regard to the town 
boundary, to carve out several apartment houses or several blocks of single family 
residences for the purpose of excluding 859 people from the district to account for 
a 7.1 % variance. 
Id. Justice White had originally raised these points in his Kirkpatrick-Wells dissent: 
"Ultimately, the courts may be asked to decide whether some families in an apartment 
house should vote in one district and some in another, if that would come closer to 
equality." 394 U.S. at 556. See also 394 U.S. at 538 (Fortas, J., concurring). However, 
respondents' and Justice White's concern for the sanctity of apartment buildings may 
have to be re-evaluated in light of the increasing sizes of these residential complexes. 
Co-op City in the Bronx, at present the world's largest cooperative housing develop-
ment, will eventually house 15,000 families. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1971: at 29, col. 8. 
Assuming the likelihood of other similar complexes being built in the future, strict 
adherence to the White logic would make districting in such areas rather difficult, 
as units of 50,000 and more people could not be split up. 
142. Justice Marshall's opinion hinted at one possible peculiarity. The fact that 
local governments frequently have fewer representatives than their state or national 
counterparts was used to help justify Abate's toleration of the 11.9% deviation. See 
text accompanying note 140 supra. This is not always the case. In the less populous 
states, the membership of the local governments, even if composed of only, four or 
five persons, will occasionally be greater in number than the state's congressional 
delegation. The greater flexibility thus available in reapportioning such local bodies 
supports the argument that they should be held to a stricter mathematical requirement 
than their state government in apportioning the House seats. Another possible factor 
to consider is the dominant residential pattern of the area governed by the reappor-
tioning legislature. A 6% population deviation among congressional districts of roughly 
400,000 people in New York City may be more excusable than the same size disparity 
among Montana's districts, even though the absolute number of people involved may 
be similar. The redrawing of district lines to transfer 25,000 people among urban 
districts may indeed necessitate the objectionable drawing of lines between floors in 
a single building. However, in the rural area dominated by single-dwelling units, the 
reallocation of 25,000 people does not produce the similar danger that district lines 
will have to make arbitrary boundary distinctions between residents of the same 
building. 
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Hamilton County, New York, are being challenged for violations of 
the "one man-one vote" rule. Assume also that each county's appor-
tionment of its ten-man legislature deviates from the ideal by 10%, 
Although the same standard should be applied, the factor of popula-
tion size may produce a different result. The population of Hamilton 
County is just 4,714,143 while Los Angeles County boasts a population 
of more than seven million residents.144 Although both cases involve 
local governments, the 10% deviation affects 700,000 people in Los 
Angeles. Unless sufficient reason is shown why the district lines could 
not be redrawn to correct the disparity of approximately 70,000 peo-
ple among the districts without detracting from the goal of fair and 
effective representation, the California legislative scheme should be 
invalidated. However, the same percentage deviation would involve 
fewer than 500 Hamilton County residents. Redrawing district lines 
in order to pick up only fifty people might be an enormously difficult 
task. Therefore, if the other elements of the county's districting 
scheme fulfill the good-faith and other Reynolds requirements, it 
should pass constitutional muster. 
This flexible approach to determining permissible percentage 
variations from the population ideal is easily incorporated within a 
single "as nearly as is practicable" standard. Courts should consider 
the practical ramifications of demanding precise mathematical equal-
ity. The extent to which a court's rulings might coerce map-makers 
into drawing objectionable district lines, which could impair the 
government's ability to provide fair and effective representation, 
should be an indication of whether the redrawn districts are "as 
nearly as is practicable" equal in population. The alternative New 
York variable-standard approach, besides resolving complex legal 
issues by simple arbitrary rules, does not enhance the probability of 
achieving better government. 
B. Sailors, Dusch, Abate, and Local Government Flexibility 
In approving Plan B's 11.9% deviation, the Abate Court relied 
heavily on one facet of Sailors, reaffirming its proposition that "viable 
local governments may need considerable flexibility in municipal 
143. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, Nur.rnER OF INHABITANTS 
NEW YORK 31 (1971) (vol. 34). 
144. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, NUMBER OF INHABITANTS 
CAI.1FORNIA 28 (1971) (vol. 6). Los Angeles County's 1970 population of 7,032,075 is 
even more remarkable as it exceeds that of 42 states. Thus the county government 
could be held to a stricter standard of "one man-one vote" than numerous state 
legislatures. 
Such disparities in county population sizes are common. In I!l62, the average county 
population was 52,135. However, 37% of the total population resided in just 65 coun• 
ties, or 2.1 % of all the counties. Meanwhile, the smallest 2!l4 counties, or 9.3%, em-
braced just 0,5% of the American populace. G. BLAIR, AMERICAN LoCAL GOVERNMENT 
48 (1964). 
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arrangements if they are to meet changing societal needs."145 Sailors' 
applicability here is questionable since its language praising local 
government flexibility, regardless of its appeal, is dictum. Sailors did 
not permit a greater deviation from "one man-one vote" than had 
other cases because of any innovative aspect of the Kent County 
school board. As previously noted, the board consisted of appointed 
officials who performed predominantly administrative tasks.146 The 
Sailors Court exempted this body from the "one man-one vote" re-
straint and therefore never even considered how strictly Reynolds 
should be applied to similar local governments. 
The actual Sailors holding that appointed administrative bodies 
need not adhere to Reynolds is inapposite to Abate. Reynolds' appli-
cability to Rockland County's apportionment scheme was never at 
issue in Abate. The Avery doctrine, that units "with general govern-
mental powers over an entire geographic area" must comply with 
Reynolds,141 unquestionably encompasses the Rockland County Leg-
islature. The functions of the new government are essentially to 
approve policies, oversee county operations, and adopt the county's 
budget. The latter task was emphasized in the Avery Court's evalua-
tion of the impact of the Commissioners Court on the citizens of 
Midland County: "In adopting the budget the court makes both 
long-term judgments about the way Midland County should develop 
-whether industry should be solicited, roads improved, recreation 
facilities built, and land set aside for schools-and immediate choices 
among competing needs."148 The Rockland County Legislature is 
involved in making similar priority determinations when formulating 
the county budget. Moreover, in contrast to the appointed officials 
in Sailors, the legislators are directly elected by the citizens of Rock-
land County. 
It was the Dusch case, 149 rather than Sailors, that suggested a more 
flexible standard for local governments because of their particular 
need for experimentation, innovation, and flexibility. In an effort to 
resolve "complex problems of the modern megalopolis in relation 
to the city, the suburbs, and the rural countryside,"150 the City of 
Virginia Beach and the neighboring Princess Anne County merged 
their governments. Many problems had prolonged the attainment of 
this desired combination. The major difficulty was devising a system 
145. 403 U.S. at 185, dting 387 U.S. at 110-11. The passage referred to is Sailors' 
often-quoted recognition that "[v)iable local governments may need many innovations, 
numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal arrange-
ments to meet changing urban conditions. We see nothing in the Constitution to 
prevent experimentation." 
146. See text accompanying note 50 supra. 
147. 390 U.S. at 485-86. 
148. 390 U.S. at 483. 
149. See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text. 
150. 387 U.S. at 117. 
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of representation- that would satisfy both the "one man-one vote"· 
principle and an apprehensive electorate.161 A proposal catering to 
the exact command of Reynolds probably would have met defeat in 
the popular referendum.152 Therefore, in order to appeal to the 
voters, the controversial borough-residency requirement for seven 
representatives was inserted. This so-called Seven-Four Plan, al-
though ratified by the electorate, was subjected to constitutional 
challenge. Finding no invidious discrimination, the Court upheld the 
Plan153-a holding that seems to recognize, especially in regard to 
innovations in regional and metropolitan governments, the need for 
:flexibility and experimentation to develop responsive forms of repre-
sentation at the local level.' 
An innovative governmental structure, crucial to the decision in 
Dusch, is totally absent in Abate. The Rockland County Legislature 
is not the end product of a consolidation with, or incorporation of, 
neighboring areas. Rather it is the same governing scheme that ex-
isted before, the sole difference being that the prior severe malappor-
tionment has been "substantially" remedied. There is nothing 
innovative or experimental about the existing structure of the Rock-
land County government. The concept of the town-based local gov-
ernment, perpetuated by Plan B, originated in New York with the 
Duke of York's laws after the English conquest of New Netherlands 
in 1664.154 The New York Colonial Assembly, on June 19, 1703, 
passed a statute creating the essential elements of town-county gov-
ernment.155 Abate thus rewarded preservation, not innovation, since 
to a large extent the decision was based on the long tradition of "over-
lapping function and dual personnel" in Rockland County govern-
ment.156 
The Supreme Court's permissive attitude toward Dusch's new 
governmental structure should not have influenced its decision in 
Abate.157 Yet the Court tolerated a large percentage deviation based 
151. See R. DIXON, supra note 3, at 549-50; Sentell, Reapportionment and Local 
Government, 1 GA. L. REv. 596, 604-05 (1967). 
152. R. DIXON, supra note 3, at 549-50. During DtlSch's oral argument, Justice 
'White asked counsel for the consolidated government whether strict application of 
"one man-one vote" to the new government would have defeated the consolidation pro• 
posal. Counsel answered in the affirmative. Id. 
153. 387 U.S. at 117. 
154. See H • .ALDERFER, AMERICAN LoCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 63 (1955). 
155. Act of June 19, 1703, ch. 133, 1 N.Y. COLONIAL LAws 1664-1775, at 539 (1894). 
This Act established a county board of supervisors comprised of one supervisor from 
each town in the county. See G. BLAIR, supra note 144, at 34. 
156. 403 U.S. at 187. 
157. This analysis perhaps explains Justice Marshall's curious exclusion of Dusch 
from his opinion. There is another major distinction between Dusch and Abate. The 
Virginia Beach representatives were all elected at large over the entire area. The 
Court therefore concluded that "one man-one vote" was satisfied as each legislator 
necessarily represented the same number of people. 387 U.S. at 115-17. Of course, cru-
cial to the Abate scheme is the fact that the legislators, although also elected at large, 
represent varying numbers of people. 
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in part on the illusory need (in this case) for "considerable flexibility" 
in "viable local" governments. The danger is that, given the total 
lack of evidence presented by the A bate defendants of any flexible, 
innovative, or experimental aspect of Plan B, future courts may con-
strue A bate to mean that all local governments should receive greater 
deference in apportionment matters. Such an interpretation, and the 
per se rule it hints at, seems very plausible when one att!:!mpts to rec-
oncile the Court's language, supposedly stressing innovation and ex-
perimentation, with its ultimate decision, which was based essentially 
on the historic traditions of Rockland County. 
Given the opportunity to clarify the suggestion in Sailors and 
Dusch that innovative or experimental approaches to solving the 
problem of local government would permit greater deviations from 
the equal-population norm, the Supreme Court in Abate merely gen-
erated more confusion. Consequently, it remains for lower courts to 
develop a coherent approach to deciding in what circumstances flex-
ible, innovative, or experimental governmental schemes can over-
come the presumption that fair and effective representation is best 
achieved by legislative districts of equal population. Hopefully, these 
courts will show greater insight into the complexities of local and 
regional government than the Supreme Court did in its superficial 
evaluation of Abate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Abate appeal came before the Supreme Court at an impor-
tant point in the "reapportionment revolution," the goal of which 
has always been the achievement of fair and effective representation. 
By 1970, many legal scholars questioned, if not openly opposed, 
the Court's approach to the problems of malapportionment.158 In any 
event the time had come for the Court to consider the practical ef-
fect of its oftentimes simplistic reapportionment standards. However, 
the opportunity presented by Abate was ill used by the Court, which 
seemed more interested in finding further easy answers to the com-
plex questions raised by reapportionment controversies. Although the 
Court may have recognized the importance of a stable government, it 
approved a legislative scheme without regard for either its perma-
nence or quality. The inherent mediocrity of multimember districts 
was brushed aside in a footnote, without any consideration of how 
much their very existence detracts from the ultimate goal. The Court, 
wary of "political thickets," unwisely stumbled into one. The poor 
results in Rockland County159 serve to reinforce the argument that 
158. See authorities cited in note 90 supra. 
159. The sought-after goal of fair and effective representation has not been achieved 
in Rockland County during two years under the Plan B legislature. In his 1972 "state 
of the county" message, the chairman of the Rockland· County Legislature, Herschel 
Greenbaum, stated that the governing body's "own reapportionment should be [its] 
chief concern" during the coming year. Greenbaum's message also requested that a new 
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such political questions are to be avoided. In the process of venturing
into new areas of judicial evaluation, the Court unnecessarily, and
quite ill-advisedly, jettisoned the previously important good-faith
aspect of the "as nearly as is practicable" standard. The Justices, in
reacting to criticism of their simplistic standards, merely developed
additional absolute rules that ignore the complexities of particular
cases. Flexibility in local governmental forms was properly praised
but improvidently rewarded-without the slightest showing of its
existence in Rockland County. Metropolitan innovations were en-
couraged, yet parochial traditions were upheld.
A bate did not improve the value of reapportionment as a vehicle
for achieving fair and effective representation. The citizens of Rock-
land County, although perhaps better off than they were before Lo-
dico, were denied by legislative and judicial failures the best chance
of achieving the ultimate goal. Other communities will be similarly
deprived until the Supreme Court integrates all of the factors in-
volved in reapportionment into a doctrine that recognizes the practi-
cal effects of theoretical slogans.
legislative map be constructed of single-member districts. In referring to Plan B's strict
correlation between town boundaries and county legislative districts, Greenbaum com-
mented: "Town lines are not sacred and they should not be regarded as such in con-
sidering county issues. The shortcomings of using these boundaries have been amply
demonstrated." The Journal News, Jan. 5, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
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